Are REDD+ community forest projects following the principles for collective action, as proposed by Ostrom? by Saeed, Abdul-Razak et al.
Are REDD+ community forest projects 
following the principles for collective 
action, as proposed by Ostrom? 
Article 
Published Version 
Creative Commons: Attribution 3.0 (CC­BY) 
Open Access 
Saeed, A.­R., McDermott, C. and Boyd, E. (2017) Are REDD+ 
community forest projects following the principles for collective 
action, as proposed by Ostrom? International Journal of the 
Commons, 11 (1). pp. 572­596. ISSN 1875­0281 doi: 
https://doi.org/10.18352/ijc.700 Available at 
http://centaur.reading.ac.uk/70525/ 
It is advisable to refer to the publisher’s version if you intend to cite from the 
work. 
Published version at: http://dx.doi.org/10.18352/ijc.700 
Identification Number/DOI: https://doi.org/10.18352/ijc.700 
<https://doi.org/10.18352/ijc.700> 
Publisher: Uopen Journals 
All outputs in CentAUR are protected by Intellectual Property Rights law, 
including copyright law. Copyright and IPR is retained by the creators or other 
copyright holders. Terms and conditions for use of this material are defined in 
the End User Agreement . 
www.reading.ac.uk/centaur 
CentAUR 
Central Archive at the University of Reading 
Reading’s research outputs online
International Journal of the Commons
Vol. 11, no 1 2017, pp. 572–596
Publisher: Uopen Journals
URL:http://www.thecommonsjournal.org
DOI: 10.18352/ijc.700
Copyright: content is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 License
ISSN: 1875-0281
Are REDD+ community forest projects following the principles 
for collective action, as proposed by Ostrom?
Abdul-Razak Saeed
Department of Geogrpahy and Environmental Science, University of Reading, Whiteknights 
campus, UK
abdul-razak.saeed@pgr.reading.ac.uk
Constance McDermott
University of Oxford, Environmental Change Institute (ECI), UK
Emily Boyd
Lund University, Centre for Sustainability Studies, Sweden
Abstract: Forested countries in the global south that have agreed to engage in 
REDD+, a policy mechanism for addressing climate change, are receiving sup-
port to improve laws, policies, systems and structures. As a mechanism initiated 
at the global level and seeking to use forests to address a global commons cri-
sis (atmospheric carbon concentration), understanding how REDD+ translates 
into implementation at the local level is essential. Therefore, using a systematic 
review approach, we examined 15 studies of REDD+ in the context of public 
and/or community managed forests, drawn from a comprehensive application of 
inclusion criteria to identify relevant published peer-reviewed empirical research. 
The common property resources literature was used to highlight the role of local 
institutions in REDD+ and to distil how REDD+ community forest projects con-
form to Ostrom’s collective action principles. The review revealed limited shar-
ing of information and decision-making authority with communities; a general 
absence of FPIC; and a lack of defined benefit sharing and conflict resolution 
arrangements in many of the REDD+ projects.
Keywords: Climate change, collective action, forest, local communities, REDD+, 
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1. Introduction
A decade, and several negotiations, after the initiation of incentivized avoided 
deforestation at the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCCC) 11th Conference of Parties by Costa Rica and Papua New Guinea, the 
mechanism has seen significant metamorphosis. The proclaimed cost-effective 
mechanism for atmospheric carbon emissions reduction is currently referred to as 
REDD+, which stands for “Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest 
Degradation” with the “+” including conservation, sustainable management of 
forests and enhancement of forest carbon stocks.
As negotiations proceeded under the UNFCCC, third party institutions such 
as the World Bank and UN agencies (UNDP, UNEP, FAO) rolled out the Forest 
Carbon Partnership Facility and the United Nations Collaborative Programme on 
REDD (UN-REDD) respectively, for interested developing countries to enter a 
REDD+ ‘readiness’ phase (Minang et al. 2014). The ‘readiness’ phase includes 
reforming governance processes; reviewing laws and policies; establishing 
national REDD+ strategies; designing workable and equitable benefits sharing 
arrangements; and establishing baseline scenarios or referencing emission levels 
(Mora et al. 2012; Minang et al. 2014).
REDD+ has faced significant criticisms relating to its implications for local 
communities’ livelihoods and socio-cultural life (Phelps et al. 2010; Minang et al. 
2014). Early critiques of the mechanism, asserted that REDD+ discussions and 
‘readiness’ activities by national governments, donors and funders focused too 
much on carbon and associated technical challenges. Issues given preference in 
the initial stages revolved around monitoring, reporting, verification, and estab-
lishing the baseline scenario for forest carbon emissions with little attention paid 
to social co-benefits such as community rights (Dooley et al. 2011; Lasco et al. 
2013; Pasgaard 2013). Critics of REDD+ have warned of the mechanism’s poten-
tial to recentralize forest governance, marginalize local communities and resource 
users, bolster corruption and entrench inequity within the forest sector (Phelps 
et al. 2010; Larson 2011; Jaung and Bae 2012). There are also fears that ben-
efits accruing from REDD+ will not be fairly distributed to local communities 
(Skutsch et al. 2013; Chomba et al. 2016). Some scholars have therefore called for 
REDD+ to recognize community rights to access, use and management of natural 
resources (Sandbrook et al. 2010); an advocacy based on a common problem-
atic of national government failures in managing natural resources (Gibson and 
Becker 2000; Heltberg 2002; Delmas and Young 2009).
A critical part of the REDD+ ‘readiness’ process involves piloting the mecha-
nism to draw out lessons and challenges, assessing the adequacy of systems and 
noting areas for reform to achieve REDD+ objectives. Though empirical studies 
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of REDD+ projects have started to emerge recently, many have focused on ‘readi-
ness’ progress at national level, or on developing REDD+ at a regional forest 
scale such as the Congo Basin. Only subsets of studies examine REDD+ projects, 
where it is possible to assess their direct impacts on local communities. These 
include conservation projects that have been re-labelled as REDD+. Minang et al. 
(2014) acknowledge that all of these studies have adopted different indicators for 
measuring progress and this makes for a difficult comparison.
Therefore, this review systematically examines REDD+ literature drawn 
from global research to highlight trends and identify gaps in our understanding 
of how REDD+ project-level initiatives, implemented on community owned or 
public lands conform to principles for successful collective action. We do this 
by drawing on Ostrom’s (1990) common property rights (CPR) principles. The 
overarching question guiding this paper is: ‘what is the evidence regarding how 
REDD+ projects have performed according to a set of collective action principles 
for effective forest management?’
2. Conceptual approach
2.1. Collective action
There are complexities in the pursuit of global collective action to address cli-
mate change, including conflicts among political and economic interests (Ostrom 
2009). While global consensus has been slow to materialize, climate action 
has been characterized by local, state and regional efforts such as in American 
metropolises, the State of California and Europe respectively (Ostrom 2009). This 
fragmented approach to climate action has been particularly evident in REDD+. 
While REDD+ was initiated by a global institution to address the contribution 
of forest loss to global emissions, it has since been operationalized largely at 
regional, state and local scales.
Particularly due to the multi-scalar characteristics associated with REDD+, 
it is critical that actors at all scales understand how norms, rules and structures 
(referred to collectively as ‘institutions’) shape REDD+ outcomes on the ground 
(Agrawal and Lemos 2007). Institutions, be it formal or informal, guide and shape 
stakeholder interactions and behaviour (Crona and Bodin 2011) including the abil-
ity to protect environmental integrity, advance social equity and enhance human 
wellbeing (Redman 2014). Functional institutional mechanisms to govern natural 
resource use have been shown to extend beyond private property arrangements 
and state ownership, to common property collective action (Agrawal 2002). The 
primary focus of this paper is on the intersection of REDD+ with these two latter 
forms, i.e. state and community-based forest management.
Ostrom (1990) identified a set of collective action principles that have proved 
essential for successful collective processes and outcomes in natural resource 
management. These principles help us to better understand how groups man-
age common property resources by means of well-established rules, laws and 
 relational processes for formal and informal institutions. Subsequent research 
REDD+ and collective action principles 575
has identified strong links between these collective action principles and forest 
condition (see Gibson and Becker 2000). Since Ostrom’s identification of these 
principles in 1990, they have been subject to various theoretical debates and 
empirical evaluations (Gautam and Shivakoti 2005). A synthesis and analysis 
by Cox et al. (2010) of a large number (91) of subsequent studies evaluating the 
Ostrom CPR design principles provide empirical and evidential support to the 
principles.
The principles, totalling 8 in number, are expanded in Table 1 and highlight 
the importance of: setting clear boundaries of the resource and resource users; 
local knowledge of the ecological system; local networks that actively build trust 
and take decisions; environmental monitoring coupled with processes for feed-
back; and mechanisms for conflict resolution. However, according to the work 
of Cox et al. (2010), a couple of the principles need to be expanded to incorpo-
rate new aspects; for example, the principle on ‘monitoring’ must, in addition 
Table 1: Collective action principles adopted from Ostrom (1990) as an analytical lens.
1. Clearly defined boundaries – The REDD+ forest project is well defined in geographical scope and 
boundary and assigned to a particular resource user group or community. This principle is often best 
served where land tenure is clearly defined with supporting documents to back titles. This effectively 
helps exclude external claims by ‘foreign’ unentitled parties. The greater the certainty of the boundary 
definition, the less costly it is to exclude outsiders.
2. Congruence between resource environment, its governance structure and rules – Governance 
structure and rules must be specific to local circumstances and characteristics of the REDD+ area. The 
rules and structures must evolve as the status of the resource and the resource environment change.
3. Decisions via collective choice arrangements – Decisions involve all the parties that have a stake 
in REDD+ forests. All voices matter and should be regarded for a generally satisfactory and accepted 
decision. Such collective choice arrangement processes should be well known by all stakeholders.
4. Effective monitoring – There is a system to monitor REDD+ and activities of stakeholders. 
Stakeholders of the resource play a major part in monitoring. All rules and monitoring outcomes should 
be transparent. This includes monitoring all safeguards that exist for REDD+ and the stakeholders in the 
project area. This principle requires a feedback mechanism.
5. Graduated sanctions and punishments for violations – All acts that go contrary to, or threaten the 
sustainability of, REDD+ and forest at large must be spelt out and publicly available to all stakeholders. 
Sanctions should be weighed against offences and repetitive violations should be more heavily sanctioned 
than first time violations.
6. Low-cost and easy-to-access conflict resolution mechanism – Stakeholders should be aware of 
where and how to channel grievances or conflicts. The resolution mechanism should be transparent, and 
handled by a trusted body with no conflict of interest. All grievances must be well documented.
7. Right of resource appropriators to self-govern – Authorities outside the REDD+ forest project area 
do not appropriate resources or their management and do not exclude or marginalize stakeholders and 
increase their vulnerabilities. Neither do state authorities practice remote governance; making the local 
community merely ‘resource watchers’.
8. Organized rules and enforcement via nested enterprises – There are various systems at varying 
levels from the local community to the district, regional and national. The lessons from the REDD+ 
projects should rise through these vertical channels to inform national policy and international 
discussions. There is also horizontal nesting.
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to environmental monitoring (the condition of the resource), encompass social 
monitoring (users monitoring each other’s behaviour). We therefore incorporate 
these suggested sub-principles into the 8 CPR principles for our examination of 
government and non-state actor REDD+ projects on community lands to establish 
evidential trends. We are cautious to note that these principles are conceived as 
the minimum necessary for successful collective management and do not rep-
resent a panacea for forest management globally. Despite this, we chose to use 
Ostrom’s collective action principles as criteria, to bind the systematic review 
within a universal framework that is helpful in contextualising and unpacking 
REDD+ projects.
2.2. Forest communities and community forestry
There are an estimated 1.2 billion people across the globe depending daily on 
forests in one way or another (den Besten et al. 2014). Out of this number, an 
estimated 300 million directly rely on forests for their livelihoods (Stoian 2005), 
and are frequently categorized as local forest communities or indigenous peoples 
(prevalent in South America and Asia), Whilst the affect of these local communi-
ties on forests is partly shaped by local needs, management decisions made at 
higher levels also affect their stake in the sustainability of natural resources and 
the development of local institutions to manage those resources (Agrawal 2002).
Not all communities dependent on forests are engaged in community forestry. 
Instead, forest management by communities spans full control and management 
at one extreme, to a total lack of engagement and involvement at the other (see 
Brown et al. 2002; Sunderlin et al. 2014). Between these two extremes, there 
are differing community forestry practices that comprise a host of arrangements, 
agreements and activities (Mayers and Vermeulen 2002). Community Forest 
Management (CFM) institutions take different forms based on the resources being 
managed such as timber, non-timber forest products, forest ecosystem services, 
among others (Larson et al. 2010). Under CFM, communities (self-defined and 
identified groups of actors) collectively govern forests based on shared rules, 
rights and obligations (Banana and Gombya-Ssembajjwe 2000).
A consolidated CFM requires the secured delineation and recognition of rights 
and obligations, referred to as tenure. Tenure over land and forests includes own-
ership and sets of rights such as rights to access, use, manage and exclude. These 
rights may be held by a person, another private entity, families, clans, commu-
nities or government (White and Martin 2002). Reportedly, many governments 
across the world have, over the years, devolved rights to local forest communities, 
based on existing evidence of local forest management being good for forests 
(Banana and Gombya-Ssembajjwe 2000).
However, Vijge and Gupta (2014) suggest that allocating authority over for-
ests to communities has had mixed results across the globe, and likewise, such 
devolution offers no guarantee of REDD+’s success. Communities must therefore 
be treated on a case-by-case basis to promote understanding of the contexts of 
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host-REDD+ communities and the factors that enable the adoption of community 
management systems that effectively reduce carbon emissions and contribute to 
social benefits (Cerbu et al. 2013). With the advent of REDD+, this paper explores 
the performance of global projects in light of the set of collective action principles 
instigated for effective forest management.
Before proceeding with this analysis, it is important to mention a few caveats. 
While the focus of this paper on collective action under REDD+, not all REDD+ 
projects need be designed in ways that require the type of local collective action 
covered by Ostrom’s principles. Secondly, ‘communities’ may be highly diverse, 
with members who differ in occupational status, religion, wealth, ethnicity, gen-
der, length of community residence, and many other variables (Di Gregorio et al. 
2008). These factors impact the ability (availability of time, money and social 
capital to participate and to voice opinions) of community members to influence 
processes. Thus collective action that succeeds in maintaining forest cover may, 
or may not, result in outcomes that are equally beneficial for all members of the 
community.
Just as community forestry may produce inequitable outcomes, REDD+ has 
been criticized for having negative impacts on communities, such as undermining 
local institutions (Corbera and Schroeder 2011). Therefore, and as a complement 
to these critiques, this study was designed to provide the first systematic evalua-
tion of the empirical evidence on how REDD+ implementation is positively con-
tributing to collective action and building communities, rather than causing harm.
3. Methods
3.1. Introduction to the systematic review
Systematic literature reviews vary from traditional reviews, and are relatively 
novel within the development and environment sector (Petrokofsky et al. 2011) 
and more so for forestry and REDD+. A well-defined methodological approach 
was laid down prior to the review, to make the process rigorous, transparent 
and replicable with a high certainty of producing similar results (Pickering and 
Byrne 2013). Using the systematic review approach, this study mapped out global 
REDD+ projects’ implementation progress and gaps in REDD+ scholarship.
3.2. Review process
The review process comprised a three-tier approach: systematic search, critical 
appraisal and synthesis (Figure 1 – www.tandfonline.com). Within each tier, vari-
ous steps were adopted and adapted from Pickering and Byrne (2013) as enunci-
ated below.
This first tier consisted of 4 steps. We defined the topic of the systematic 
review to look into evidence regarding the performance of REDD+ implementa-
tion, according to a set of collective action principles proposed for effective forest 
management. We posed the research question; ‘what is the evidence regarding 
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how REDD+ projects (on public and community lands) have performed accord-
ing to a set of collective action principles for effective forest management?’ Based 
on the question, the study identified combinations of key words (Table 2), relevant 
to the literature search. The final tier 1 step identified databases and searched for 
literature. These databases were: Science Direct; Web of Science; Google Scholar; 
and Google. We used all combinations in Category 1 and Category 2 with ‘for-
est governance’ for the first set of searches. The second set of searches included 
all combinations of key words in Category 2 and Category 3 with ‘REDD+’. All 
combinations of searches used the logic ‘AND’ with no publication date limits 
stipulated. As the literature search took place in February 2014, none of the papers 
retrieved for review are after this date.
Tier 1: Systematic search
1. Review question: How is
REDD+ implementation and
management affecting local
communities?
8. Read bulk of papers and
filled in relevant categories and
sub-categories pertaining to
CPR principle criteria in Excel
7. Entered first 20% of final 15
papers. Tested and revised
database categories and sub-
categories
6. Structured personal
database in Excel using Ostrom
(1990) CPR principles as
criteria
5. Read and assessed 69
articles initially sourced as
relevant based on abstracts
12. Synthesised review
findings, drafted, revised and
submitted paper
11. Drafted key results,
discussions and identified gaps
in knowledge
10. Evaluated key results, and
conclusion in relation to
collective governance
9. Reviewed Excel summary
table (reviewed by Professor of
resilience Geography)
2. Identified key words from
review question and grouped
them into 3 categories (see
Table 1)
3. Identified databases for
literature search; Science
Direct, Web of Science, Google
Scholar and Google
4. Searched databases, read
abstracts of sourced literature
to identify relevance based on
‘internal’ inclusion criteria
Tier 2: Critical appraisal Tier 3: Synthesis
Figure 1: Systematic review process adapted from Pickering and Byrne (2013).
Table 2: Key words for database literature search.
Category 1  Category 2  Category 3
REDD+  Civil society  Forest governance
Forests in climate change  Local community  Institutions
Avoided deforestation  Forest communities Forest management
 Indigenous peoples  Safeguards
 Local stakeholders  Participation
  Benefits
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Under the second tier, we read all the abstracts of the literature sourced and 
ascertained their relevance to the key research question. Articles were judged 
based on a set of ‘inclusion’ criteria applied to abstracts to narrow the volumi-
nous collection of studies retrieved by the keyword searches (Pickering and Byrne 
2013). The ‘inclusion’ criteria, decided internally by researchers were: 1) articles 
had to be published peer-reviewed empirical research; and 2) had to focus on 
REDD+ projects, not general forest governance or management. By REDD+ 
project, this study refers to any project rolled out to reduce emissions from for-
ests in line with UNFCCC forest-climate objectives and any previous conserva-
tion projects re-labelled as REDD+. Therefore, we use ‘REDD+ projects’ to also 
embody ‘REDD+ like’ projects that may or may not be officially recognizable 
under the UNFCCC. In this paper, we consider government-led REDD+ projects, 
government-recognized REDD+ projects and projects by non-state actors (such 
as NGOs and private investors) implemented on public or community lands. In 
validating papers based on their abstracts, a total of 69 papers passed the initial 
‘inclusion’ screening. All 69 papers were again subjected to the ‘inclusion’ criteria 
via thorough reading of the entire contents. After which 15 papers met the inclu-
sion criteria. This sample size reflects the stage of REDD+ development and is 
also not an unusual sample size for a systematic review.
A second set of criteria (with sub-categories) were framed in a Microsoft 
Excel database and used to assess the 15 articles. This second set of criteria was 
drawn externally, based on the works of Ostrom (1990), Dietz et al. (2003) and 
Cox et al. (2010). Ostrom’s 8 CPR principles were adopted and adapted to serve 
as a lens for reviewing the final set of 15 papers. The first 20% of papers were 
entered into the database and an iterative process of testing and revising the data-
base categories was undertaken before the bulk of the papers were evaluated and 
entered into the database.
Under tier 3, where gaps in research were identified and findings were synthe-
sized for an overview of REDD+ projects globally, the CPR principles allowed 
a critical evaluation of institutions of local level REDD+ projects and the related 
outcomes. The 15 studies reviewed, contained REDD+ projects (Table 3) spread 
across 14 countries: Tanzania, Papua New Guinea, Brazil, Peru, Vietnam, 
Mozambique, Philippines, Cameroon, Bolivia, Democratic Republic of Congo, 
Indonesia, Cambodia, Nepal and Ecuador as shown in Figure 2.
4. Findings and discussion
4.1. Clearly defined boundaries
The reviewed literature frequently echoed Ostrom’s principles (1990) in stat-
ing that the physical delineation of community and forest boundaries is essen-
tial for REDD+ implementation. However, these boundaries were as yet largely 
undefined across most REDD+ project areas in selected literature, such as in 
Ulu Masen and Mount Cameroon sites in Indonesia and Cameroon respectively 
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(Sunderlin et al. 2014). In addition to this physical delineation, the majority of 
reviewed papers regarded the specific bundles of rights articulated in tenure 
arrangements as another important element in resource management.
Land ownership in the project sites was revealed as either customary or statu-
tory, with these two ownership forms commonly co-existing (Awono et al. 2014). 
Some studies found forestlands strictly under statutory control (de jure) but often 
with communities residing near the natural resources carrying out informal man-
agement (de facto). Across the selected literature on REDD+ on communal/pub-
lic lands, tenure remained un-clarified in project areas. This meant that REDD+ 
sites in countries like Papua New Guinea, Indonesia and Cameroon are vulnerable 
to governments overriding customary ownership, and allocating  concessions to 
industrial companies or private sector actors (Murdiyarso et al. 2012). Clearly, 
tenure security has been prominent in REDD+ discourse since its inception 
(Larson 2011); however, this has not often translated into progress in tenure clari-
fication and security.
Further, 5 papers examined the right of exclusion as an element of secure 
tenure. These studies highlighted that communities’ perception of their right 
to exclude did not always translate into actual ability to exclude. This is the 
case in the ‘Central Xingu REDD+ pilot’ (Brazil); ‘Making REDD+ work for 
Communities and Forest Conservation Project’ (Tanzania); and the ‘Ulu Masen 
Project’ (Indonesia), among others (Sunderlin et al. 2014). Commonly, govern-
ments distribute rights over community lands to outsiders or tend to appropriate 
0
Mozambique
Tanzania
Democratic Republic of Congo
Cameroon
Brazil
Ecuador
Bolivia
Peru
Cambodia
Indonesia
Nepal
Vietnam
Papua New Guniea
Philippines
Frequency
Frequency of countries in review
As
ia
So
ut
h
Am
er
ic
a
Af
ric
a
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Figure 2: Country frequency in the 15 studies reviewed.
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lands for other purposes including claims of ‘for public interest’ (Beymer-Farris 
and Bassett 2012; Murdiyarso et al. 2012). Having legal title documents there-
fore plays a key role in enhancing security of tenure (Omura 2008). Thus, com-
munities that lack formal legal recognition of customary land rights (maintained 
historically through customs and preserved by local knowledge) risk having their 
lands confiscated by governments (Sunderlin et al. 2014). Under a REDD+ policy 
mechanism, where communities may have legal liability for obligations, recog-
nized community rights and the ability to exclude outsiders are essential to ensure 
the reduction of carbon emissions and its permanence (Palmer 2011).
To establish a functioning REDD+, projects are working to clarify and secure 
tenure for forests and lands in the villages and communities in which they operate. 
A process mainly dominated in the locality by community mapping and bound-
ary demarcations. However, in the case of REDD+, tenure is further fraught 
with uncertainties around carbon rights (Hajek et al. 2011; Duchelle et al. 2014; 
Sunderlin et al. 2014). Very few countries have developed carbon rights (Skutsch 
et al. 2013) to guide REDD+ projects. It has been argued that, to avoid conflicts, 
carbon rights have to be defined and the complexity around its transfer further 
unpacked (Palmer 2011). Even though Sunderlin et al. (2014) argue that drawing 
a clear distinction between carbon rights and forest tenure is essential, this dis-
tinction was not always realized in practice in the studies reviewed. For example, 
Indonesia’s regulatory tenure framework that guides local REDD+ projects does 
not separate forest tenure, land tenure, or carbon rights (Resosudarmo et al. 2014). 
In another vein, as identified by Larson et al. (2010) in Mexico and Costa Rica, 
the arrangement is to have various rights and responsibilities relevant to carbon 
management and benefits within the concept of stewardship for forest users, as 
opposed to ownership.
Power dynamics, actor interests and demands, entrenched institutional sys-
tems and financial rewards associated with REDD+, will most certainly influence 
the processes of defining carbon rights (Angelsen et al. 2012). Contained within 
the process, are the possible threats of elite capture, conflicts and inequity (Larson 
2011). Economic and political interests have in some cases, such as in Indonesia 
and Papua New Guinea, promoted favouritism among state officials and indus-
trial actors (Murdiyarso et al. 2012; Resosudarmo et al. 2014). These informal 
relationships might affect REDD+ communities in ways not yet understood, and 
therefore need to be further researched.
4.2. Congruence between resource appropriation, rules and local needs
Eleven studies revealed a broad range of livelihood activities that indigenous 
peoples or local forest communities engaged in, including agriculture (shifting 
cultivation), charcoal production, the rearing of livestock, gathering of fuel wood 
and collecting non-timber forest products (for trade and subsistence). In some 
other places like Northwest Mato Grosso and Acre in Brazil, community liveli-
hoods were fishing, hunting, wage labour and business (Duchelle et al. 2014). 
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The majority of these livelihoods interact with forest resources and therefore raise 
issues regarding their congruence with REDD+. Though the literature revealed 
evidence of indigenous peoples and local communities’ reliance on land and for-
ests for their daily activities and livelihoods, it failed to demonstrate considerable 
evidence of successful integration of REDD+ carbon storage objectives with the 
livelihood objectives of communities.
The REDD+ strategy for each project area requires giving attention to commu-
nity livelihoods and their impact on land use and carbon emissions. Considerable 
REDD+ actions to safeguard and promote community livelihoods alongside 
emission reductions are expected to decrease community vulnerability to climate 
change, whereas community vulnerability will be increased should REDD+ nega-
tively impact their livelihoods. REDD+ requires new and conscious thinking on 
how to combine the objectives of carbon emission reduction with community 
needs (Somorin et al. 2012), as synergies will not necessarily develop naturally 
(Cerbu et al. 2013).
Some of the selected REDD+ projects engaged with certification schemes 
and international standards, including: Plan Vivo (N’hambita in Mozambique); 
Climate, Community and Biodiversity Alliance (CCBA) (April-Salomei in PNG); 
and the Verified Carbon Standards (VCS) (Cusco/Madre de Dios in Peru). In con-
trast, REDD+ projects in some countries such as Cameroon followed national 
implementation rules and guidelines formed via multi-stakeholder platforms at 
ministerial level. Though some projects adopt CCBA, VCS and Plan Vivo, it was 
not clear if these guidelines represent fair and legitimate rules in the communi-
ties within which they are applied (Gautam and Shivakoti 2005). As externally 
designed rules, there is a likelihood of negative consequences if these guidelines 
are imposed without effort to match to local customs and to fit in with exist-
ing livelihood strategies (Cox et al. 2010). The specific rules regarding resource 
extraction and whether REDD+ project designs accounted for congruence between 
usage and provision rules with respect to local conditions and needs were incon-
clusive from the review.
The selected literature further revealed that certain governance issues affected 
the congruence between the state of the resource and the rules and standards 
needed to ensure improved forest cover. Major problems included corruption; 
elite capture of resources; entrenched structures and systems that enforce ineq-
uity; and economic interests driving unsustainable timber exploitation. It must 
therefore be recognised that power relations can lead to the co-opting of local 
decisions and processes and marginalization of some community members (Di 
Gregorio et al. 2008; Eriksen et al. 2015).
4.3. Decisions via collective choice arrangements
To analyze how decisions are made, we first examined information sharing 
approaches; studies indicated a suite of approaches ranging from meetings and 
training to capacity building workshops. Sunderlin et al. (2014) found in some 
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cases that private project implementers did not divulge full information on 
REDD+ to forest-based communities. This was the case in 6 project sites (3 in 
Brazil and 3 in Indonesia) where the implementers totally refrained from men-
tioning REDD+ when they engaged communities. In addition, Free Prior and 
Informed Consent (FPIC) under the United Nations Declaration on Indigenous 
Peoples Rights (UNDRIP), which involves providing full and accurate informa-
tion in a timely manner to communities to enable decisions on a project, is largely 
limited in the REDD+ projects reviewed. There is substantial evidence that some 
communities face inequity in engagement based on the limited, and in some cases 
lack of, REDD+ knowledge. Access to knowledge is one approach to reducing the 
inequity and resource capture gap (Berkes 2009). However, based on findings, we 
note that information-sharing approaches in REDD+ need review.
In most of the countries featured in the review, findings revealed that project 
developers dominate decision-making and project design. For example, in Groom 
and Palmer’s (2012) research on REDD+ projects in N’hambita, Mozambique, 
project developers had already decided the generic design of the projects before 
subjecting the design to community inputs to tweak it to fit local circumstances. 
The engagement processes often do not portray participatory outcomes, as evi-
denced by Lasco et al.’s (2013) Philippines’ Visayas and Luzon Island projects. 
In Leggett and Lovell’s (2012) study of April-Salomei in Papua New Guinea, 
though discussions had been participatory, inputs to shape decisions and designs 
were selectively chosen by the project implementers external to the communi-
ties. They noted only positive outcomes were reflected whereas negative opinions 
were ignored. In addition, the language of engagement and contract documents 
were in some cases not tailored to local languages of the communities. This lack 
of sensitivity to local situations and practices such as non-disclosure of full infor-
mation to communities, entrench inequity. The experience of decision making in 
the 12 REDD+ projects across Peru was reported to be different however, as proj-
ect leads were indigenous peoples, grassroots NGOs, and forest concessionaires 
(Hajek et al. 2011).
Though engaging communities catalyses a working knowledge of decisions 
and procedures, and increases ownership, there is an outstanding question of what 
constitutes adequate engagement in REDD+. It has been argued that having a 
stakeholder-agreed minimum standard for participating in REDD+ project lev-
els will foster a collective decision making approach for effective management 
of relationships between various stakeholders (Berkes 2009). These minimum 
standards can include the minimum time needed to allow communities to digest, 
absorb and form their own decisions and positions to feedback to the process.
4.4. Effective monitoring
Elements monitored across REDD+ projects in selected literature differed; they 
included forest and tree exploitation, carbon, programme activities and stakeholder 
engagement. In the Khasi and Gaw Hills pilot projects in India, provisions and 
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proposals were made to monitor carbon and biodiversity benefits. The monitoring 
approaches identified in this review range from strict licensing systems based, for 
example, on quota allocation, to the use of remote sensing and satellites. Other 
processes include forest inventory and observations via patrol systems.
There were recognized risks of excluding forest-based communities or indig-
enous peoples from monitoring systems. This is linked in literature to elite capture 
of resources and processes as seen in the REDD+ projects in Papua New Guinea, 
Indonesia and Vietnam (Murdiyarso et al. 2012), resulting in disempowerment 
and marginalization of locals. With respect to the principle, we found that stud-
ies largely reported monitoring of the resource condition and lacked any mention 
of the monitoring of behaviour of users by users. For a successful community 
based natural resource management, Cox et al. (2010) posit the importance of 
both social monitoring and environmental monitoring. There was also a lack 
of focus on the essence of a feedback system for the monitoring framework in 
selected literature, except Pasgaard (2013) in the social-dimensioned study on 
Oddar-Meanchey (Cambodia), who cursorily broached the subject.
To establish the effectiveness, efficiency and equity of REDD+, it can be 
argued that monitoring should extend beyond carbon to costs, procedural and 
socio-economic outcomes. Other arguments have been levelled to integrate 
REDD+ impacts on biodiversity in the monitoring framework (Gardner et al. 
2012) and the performance of safeguards. Monitoring safeguards is currently 
lacking in on-going projects and, for those kicking off, plans to monitor safe-
guards were not visible (Pasgaard 2013; Somorin et al. 2014). These safeguard-
monitoring systems can rope in a monitoring framework for REDD+ co-benefits 
(Somorin et al. 2014). Safeguards in the review comprised respecting the rights 
of forest-dependent communities (access, participation, Free Prior Informed 
Consent); biodiversity protection/rights of nature; benefits sharing (equity); 
recognizing indigenous knowledge and customs; and ensuring permanence. 
As countries are increasingly moving from projects towards jurisdictional and 
national level programmatic approaches (see Ravikumar et al. 2015), commu-
nities may not be engaged in monitoring since this is not a UNFCCC require-
ment for carbon or safeguard measurements. However, it is noted that there is a 
growing consensus amongst practitioners that communities adequately trained 
for monitoring can produce data comparable in quality to data produced by pro-
fessionals (Fry 2011).
4.5. Graduated sanctions and punishments for violations
The process of determining sanctions and the actor(s) involved in such processes 
were not tackled in any of the literature reviewed. The various studies were also 
silent on the forms of sanctions existing in various projects, except Resosudarmo 
et al.’s (2014) study of REDD+ in Indonesian villages, in which he reports sanc-
tion forms including jail time, compensation fines, confiscation, oral social disap-
proval and physical punishments.
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To enhance resource governance and management including rule adherence, 
sanctions and punishments are essential for effective forest institutions (Mehring 
et al. 2011). However, from the REDD+ projects reviewed, we do not know what 
sanctions exist, how they came to exist or the impact they have on communities. 
Violations of natural resource rules vary in type and magnitude; thus, according to 
the Commons literature, sanctions have to be graduated (Ostrom 1990). First time 
violations must correspond to lesser sanctions whilst repeated offences attract 
steeper sanctions. Sanctions also have to correspond to the magnitude of the vio-
lations. Pertinent questions include: How can sanctions for violations be intro-
duced and by whom? How should a system decide what sanctions correspond to 
what violations and to what degree? Mehring et al. (2011) found that implementa-
tion of state driven formal rules were not effective in the past. Therefore such a 
process requires buy-in from local people as sanctioning systems and sanctions 
must fit their circumstances, culture and norms (Mehring et al. 2011; Ramcilovic-
Suominen and Hansen 2012). Likewise, it is key to consider what sanctions under 
REDD+ means for community cohesion.
4.6. Low cost and easy-to-access conflict resolution mechanism
The need for a conflict resolution mechanism in REDD+ implementation was dis-
cussed by 4 of the 15 of the studies reviewed. It was evident that the current state 
of un-clarified tenure across global REDD+ project sites was seen as one of the 
first threats of conflict arising within REDD+. Even where land tenure is clarified 
and secured, conflict resolution mechanisms are necessary to ensure regularized 
tenure is sustained (Duchelle et al. 2014).
According to Ostrom’s principles, conflicts and contentions require fair and 
just systems of adjudication so that they do not aggravate and threaten REDD+ 
permanence. The selected literature revealed that little attention has been paid to 
REDD+ conflict resolution mechanisms. Therefore according to these principles, 
access to grievance redress may be essential at the lowest level of REDD+ imple-
mentation to avoid bias and conflict of interest. It should in addition, be acces-
sible and inexpensive for aggrieved actors to seek redress (Ostrom 1990). Seeking 
redress requires a transparent and public process that specifies how and where 
appeals of dissatisfied parties must be channelled.
4.7. Right of resource appropriators to self-govern and to benefit
Four of the selected articles examined communities’ collective ability to organize 
under REDD+. In the study of Northern Rufiji Delta Islands by Beymer-Farris 
and Bassett (2012), communities were reported to have collectively worked 
together and had historically opposed outside influences. In Waorani, Cofan and 
Awa (Ecuador), distrust for top-level indigenous leaders suspected to align with 
government and other special interests, led to a disintegration of collective views 
and actions of forest-based communities for REDD+. In addition, for some com-
munities, members were more loyal to families and clans than the community 
588 Abdul-Razak Saeed et al.
as a whole, and this affected their self-governance for collective action (Reed 
2011).
To function collectively, some trust in allegiance to community aspirations or 
goals plays a big part (Reed 2008). A stronger tie (cultural homogeneity) amongst 
community members is a pre-requisite to collective functioning and sustainability 
(Bardhan and Dayton-Johnson 2002; McManners 2014). Research on the extent 
to which trust, or the lack of it, will impact REDD+ success in meeting its objec-
tives and why some communities foster collective action and others do not, may 
help to foster greater understanding of REDD+. In classic forest management, the 
size of the community has been indicated to have importance in the success of 
collective action (Agrawal 2000).
In the Waorani, Cofan and Awa (Ecuador) study, there was a Confederación de 
Nacionalidades Indígenas del Ecuador network that indigenous communities had 
ceased to recognize and use as their mouthpiece. Unlike the foregoing case where 
a coalition existed but lost legitimacy, Somorin et al. (2014) found the reverse in 
Cameroon where a new network had been formed and was garnering support from 
the wider community. In Awae and Akok areas of Cameroon, Cerbu et al. (2013) 
identified various groups, and individuals as members of one or more groups. 
There was a farmer association group, which was particularly well organized and 
effective in decision-making. Literature on Tanzania disclosed that 13 villages had 
formed a collective body called MUHIMA for forest management but which rec-
ognizably would affect REDD+ (Mustalahti et al. 2012), whilst in Ecuador, Reed 
(2011) found that organized groups experienced conflicts due to different philo-
sophical viewpoints of village elders’ interests and local reality demands.
On the subject of community benefits, the selected literature treated REDD+ 
benefits as the financial assistance to undertake REDD+ readiness and the payments 
to be made for delivering results. Results based benefits ranged from community 
livelihood programmes and enterprise and infrastructure development (Visayas 
and Luzon, Philippines), to agricultural systems diversification (Awae and Akok, 
Cameroon) and financial payments (Cofan, Waorani, and Awa, Ecuador). What 
remained scanty and much of which was not clear in the review was who the 
recipients of REDD+ benefits were. In some cases such as the Cofan, Waorani, 
and Awa study, communities were required to present an investment plan on the 
communal use of benefits (Reed 2011), whereas in N’hambita in Mozambique, 
performance payments were made individually to participating households with 
a portion of benefits carved out for purposes that benefited the whole community 
(Groom and Palmer 2012).
The review identified that deciding who benefits, what they benefit from, and 
how the benefits get to them, are all outstanding issues that need to be fleshed out 
in most REDD+ countries that are implementing projects.
4.8. Organized rules and enforcement via nested enterprises
Eight out of 15 papers showed evidence of a link between project level and national 
level REDD+ activities. Often, a national framework or policy strategy shaped the 
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form and activities of REDD+ at all levels. There was evidence of nested gov-
ernance arrangements across various cases and these were divided between the 
national, regional and community level. REDD+ nesting in the selected literature 
was clearly vertical (e.g. between user groups and government authorities) with 
limited mention of horizontal nesting (e.g. among user groups) (Cox et al. 2010). 
The nature of REDD+ as a mechanism emanating from higher levels of global 
environmental governance causes implementation to rely on nested approaches. 
For instance, changing local interactions with forests via REDD+ projects is 
reflected in the national level reform of policies and strategies to rectify unsustain-
able timber extraction and cross-sectoral policy conflicts on land use (Murdiyarso 
et al. 2012).
Four studies highlighted national REDD+ committees that were comprised of 
various stakeholders and were mandated to make decisions. In some cases, there 
were inter-ministerial REDD+ committees that fostered coordination amongst 
sector ministries and agencies. None of the studies presented clear lines of respon-
sibility and reporting for the REDD+ elements in their cases. A nested approach 
allows the determination of spaces for reform on practical issues that require pol-
icy backing at the national level.
5. Conclusion
Using a systematic review approach, this paper contributes to our understand-
ing of how REDD+ project-level initiatives implemented on community owned 
or public lands conform to Ostrom’s (1990) principles for successful collective 
action. This revealed many challenges across countries and world regions.
We found, for instance, that tenure clarity and security, including carbon 
rights, is high on the REDD+ discourse but pragmatically has seen very little 
headway at implementation levels. While communities were engaged in the 
REDD+ projects, their engagement was often in an ad-hoc fashion. Decisions 
were taken before communities were consulted to gauge their reaction. Many of 
the REDD+ projects examined under this review demonstrated a lack of FPIC, 
and the withholding of information by project implementers in a bid to manage 
community expectations.
Other gaps in REDD+ on the ground include the elite capture of resources 
and corruption, which frequently pre-date the start of REDD+ projects. There 
has frequently been inadequate benefit-distribution, often exacerbated by a lack 
of clarity in project design regarding who is expected to benefit, what they are to 
benefit and how they will benefit.
The systematic review further allowed this paper to highlight the areas in 
need of further research regarding the successful implementation of the REDD+ 
mechanism. The gaps in research that were identified are:
•	 There was limited research that clearly explained how the design of 
REDD+ projects on community forests and public lands addressed 
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 community involvement in decision-making. Building on this, research 
is required to establish both inter-stakeholder and intra-community social 
impacts of REDD+ including any impacts that community heterogeneity, 
such as gender, may have on REDD+ implementation, and vice versa.
•	 The review indicates that implementing REDD+ involves multi-stake-
holder, multi-institutional and various governance approaches at nested 
levels. As realized, multi stakeholder platforms play a major role in the 
REDD+ process. However certain key elements such as conflict resolu-
tion mechanisms and benefit sharing systems are key issues that need to be 
unpacked to understand how these will impact forest-based communities 
and REDD+ carbon storage objectives.
•	 Literature is scant on the rules for governing resource use in REDD+ pro-
jects, how the rules were formed, how often they are renewed and what 
leads to their review.
•	 Research into sanctions and punishments for violations needs to be carried 
out to establish how sanctions are determined, what sanctions exist, who 
imposes sanctions and what sanctions mean for community cohesion.
Using Ostrom’s design principles proved useful in understanding the gaps, both on 
the ground and in the research, in the context of REDD+ projects. Many of these 
gaps may be similar to those found in the practice of community forestry more 
generally. But nevertheless, further research is needed on how to best address 
these gaps, if REDD+ is to be used as a tool to support community forestry.
Available information in some studies was insufficient to examine the rel-
evance of all principles as a lens for evaluating empirical evidence on REDD+ 
implementation. For instance, principles 5, 6 and 8 were not well elaborated 
in the literature reviewed. While clearly much more could be done to explore 
Ostrom’s principles, there are also limits to the degree to which this frame-
work can explain all the issues, barriers and opportunities to communities 
from REDD+. In addition, it is important to consider other complementary 
frameworks, such as the ‘equity framework’ (see McDermott et al. 2013), or 
the ‘justice framework’ (see Sikor et al. 2010) to build upon an understand-
ing of contextual, procedural and distributive aspects of REDD+ at community, 
national and regional scales.
This paper focused on projects at the community level. In future, it is highly 
likely that REDD+ projects will be required to fit within a more scaled-up 
and coordinated national REDD+ structure. From this study we conclude that 
Ostrom’s principles contribute an important starting point for understanding local 
institutions of REDD+ governance, which can then be used to inform the scaling 
up of REDD+. While the UNFCCC focuses on the reporting and achievement 
of both carbon reductions and safeguards implementation at the national level, 
the success of REDD+ implementation rests ultimately with its ability to engage 
effectively with the local actors shaping its enactment on the ground.
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